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  Niall	  Ferguson’s	  biography	  of	  Siegmund	  Warburg	  probably	  came	  out	  just	  in	  time,	  in	  2010,	  to	  be	  taken	  up	  as	  a	  topical	  work	  on	  a	  major	  City	  figure.	  Now	  some	  five	  years	   later	  one	  has	   to	  doubt	  whether	   the	  name	  of	  Siegmund	  Warburg	  signifies	  much	   at	   all.	  What	  was	   intended	   as	   a	  work	   to	  mark	   and	   celebrate	   the	   life	   of	   a	  financier	   now	   reads,	   just	   as	   validly,	   as	   an	   important	   work	   of	   historical	  scholarship.	   The	   attraction	   now	   lies	   in	   seeing	   how	   a	   career	   of	   heroic	   financial	  innovation	   has	   become	   submerged	   by	   a	   world	   of	   financial	   mayhem	   on	   an	  industrial	  scale	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	   is	  no	  longer	  possible	  to	  talk	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  banking	   values	   that	   so	   animated	   Siegmund	  Warburg	   -­‐	   	   what	   he	   called	   the	   feu	  
sacré.	  	  
	  
Learning	  from	  Weimar	  Unlike	   his	   famous	   uncles	   (Aby,	   Max,	   Paul,	   Felix	   and	   Fritz	   –	   the	   so-­‐called	  
Mittelweg	  Warburgs)	  who	   belonged	   to	   a	   particular	   bourgeois	   Jewish	  milieu	   in	  Hamburg,	   Siegmund	   was	   brought	   up	   in	   pastoral	   Swabia	   some	   miles	   south	   of	  Stuttgart.	  Work	  and	  a	  reflexive	  perfection	   in	  work	  were	  traits	   implanted	  by	  his	  mother.	   He	   was	   17	   when	   the	   Wilhelmine	   Kaiserreich	   fell	   to	   pieces,	   and	   his	  youthful	  heroes	  were	  the	  action	  man	  figures	  of	  Max	  Weber	  and	  Walter	  Rathenau,	  the	  one	  creating	  a	  political	  framework	  for	  a	  new	  Germany,	  the	  other	  an	  economic	  model	  for	  regenerating	  a	  backward	  economy.	  	  	  Siegmund	  belonged	  to	  the	  ‘gebildete’	  class,	  fully	  educated	  in	  the	  classics,	  Schiller	  and	   Goethe,	   but	   especially	   drawn	   to	   the	   modernist	   novels	   of	   Thomas	   Mann.	  Warburg	  was	  a	  Persönlichkeit,	  that	  is	  he	  had	  attitude	  and	  never	  left	  his	  literary,	  political	   and	   commercial	   attitudes	   unremarked.	   Interestingly	   his	   first	   vocation	  could	   have	   been	   politics.	   Although	   he	  went	   to	  work	   in	  Hamburg	   in	   the	   family	  firm,	  led	  by	  his	  uncle	  Max	  Warburg	  and	  then	  one	  of	  the	  leading	  private	  banks	  in	  Germany,	   he	   joined	   the	   German	   Democratic	   Party	   -­‐	   the	   centre	   party	   for	   the	  educated	   classes	   -­‐	   and	  would	   have	   been	   quite	   happy	   putting	   his	   banking	   and	  economic	   skills	   at	   the	   service	   of	   the	   Weimar	   Republic.	   What	   has	   to	   be	  appreciated	  is	  that	  although	  the	  Weimar	  Republic	  was	  a	  victim	  of	  the	  Nazi	  power	  grab,	   as	   a	   young	  man	   Siegmund	  Warburg	  was	   exposed	   to	   and	  part	   of	   its	   huge	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intellectual,	   cultural	   and	   political	   vitality.	   As	   late	   as	   October	   1930	   he	   was	  speaking	  of	  the	  “enormous	  strength	  in	  terms	  of	  life	  and	  ideas	  that	  there	  is	  still	  in	  Germany..”.	  2	  Weimar	  was	  not	  a	  failed	  state,	  it	  was	  an	  abrogated	  state.	  	  Although	   a	  member	  of	   an	   international	   banking	  dynasty	   (New	  York,	  Hamburg,	  and	   Berlin),	   it	   is	   valid	   to	   think	   of	   him	   as	   a	  Weimar	   intellectual:	   he	  was	   social	  democratic	  in	  outlook,	  he	  had	  philosophical	  and	  cultural	  ideals,	  he	  was	  devoted	  to	  Freudian	  psychology	  and	  Nietzsche,	  he	  was	  an	  acute	  observer	  and	  he	  made	  his	  mostly	   progressive	   views	   known	   to	   leading	   figures,	   whether	   in	   banking,	  industry,	  politics	  or	  the	  arts.	  This	  is	  what	  makes	  his	  career	  in	  the	  City	  of	  London	  interesting.	   To	   adapt	   a	  German	  philosopher	   of	   the	   early	   20th	   century,	   Edmund	  Husserl,	   Warburg’s	   horizon	   of	   meaning	   extended	   far	   further	   than	   his	   fellow	  bankers.	  He	  designated	  reference	  points	  in	  his	  outlook	  within	  which	  a	  rich	  world	  of	  possibilities	  and	  opportunities	  could	  be	  opened	  up.	  	  The	   contrast	   between	   the	   environment	   he	   left	   behind	   in	   Berlin,	   as	   a	   junior	  partner	  in	  the	  private	  bank	  of	  M.M.	  Warburg,	  and	  the	  environment	  he	  entered	  in	  the	  early	  1940s	  in	  the	  City	  of	  London	  is	  striking.	  The	  business	  of	  the	  pre-­‐1930,	  pre-­‐crash	   world	   of	   M.M.	   Warburg	   was	   based	   on	   loans	   and	   bond	   issues	   to	  corporations,	  municipalities	  and	  states	  as	  well	  as	  the	  discounting	  and	  acceptance	  of	  bonds;	  it	  was	  also	  a	  deposit	  taking	  bank.	  The	  Warburg	  family	  was	  a	  network	  of	  contacts	  in	  banks,	  businesses	  and	  governments	  spread	  across	  the	  world.	  Capital	  controls	  did	  not	  exist,	  currencies	  were	  convertible	  according	  to	  a	  fixed	  exchange	  rate,	   and	   moving	   money	   and	   bills	   between	   banks	   was	   a	   private,	   unregulated	  matter.	  	  M.M.	  Warburg’s	  profitability	  was	  fatally	  undermined	  by	  non-­‐performing	  loans	  to	  a	   weakening	   German	   economy	   and	   the	   extent	   of	   its	   dollar	   foreign	   deposits,	  which	  were	  withdrawn	   by	   fearful	   investors	   as	   the	   German	  mark	   became	   non-­‐convertible.	   Siegmund	  was	   critical	   of	   the	   leadership	   of	  Max	  Warburg	  who	   had	  routinised	  the	  firm	  around	  loans	  to	  prestige	  clients.	  Siegmund	  wanted	  the	  firm	  to	  be	  led	  from	  Berlin	  not	  Hamburg,	  and	  the	  growing	  international	  business	  had	  to	  be	  secured	  by	  close	  links	  to	  political	  contacts	  in	  Berlin.	  He	  was	  also	  critical	  of	  the	  family	  dynamics	  within	  the	   firm,	  which	  was	  based	  on	  what	  Max	  Weber	  termed	  family	   communism.	   Reward	   did	   not	   follow	   individual	   competence	   but	   was	  invested	   back	   into	   the	   family	   enterprise	   as	   a	  whole.	   Young	   Siegmund	   saw	   the	  firm	  had	  to	  change	  to	  survive,	  and	  he	  was	  equally	  pro-­‐active	  in	  giving	  advice	  to	  the	  Weimar	  government	  on	  its	  economic	  policy.	  	  	  The	  weakened	  M.M.	  Warburg	  firm	  was	  forced	  to	  aryanize.	  Max	  Warburg,	  a	  pillar	  of	   the	   Weimar	   establishment,	   on	   whom	   the	   Nazis	   for	   a	   long	   period	   were	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dependent	   for	  export	  and	   import	   credits,	  was	   forced	  out	  and	  had	   to	   resign	  his	  numerous	  directorships.	  He	  had	  an	  especially	  close	  and	  constructive	  relationship	  with	   the	  Hamburg-­‐American	   shipping	   line	   (HAPAG)	   over	   decades,	   and	   he	  was	  expelled	   from	   the	   board	   on	   the	   orders	   of	   the	   Nazi	   mayor	   of	   Hamburg.	   The	  expulsion	  was	   formally	   confirmed	   at	   a	   board	   and	   lunch	  meeting,	   and	   on	   such	  occasions	  valedictory	  speeches	  were	  given.	  No	  one	  rose	  to	  thank	  Max	  Warburg	  for	  his	  years	  of	  service,	  and	  quick	  as	  a	  flash	  Warburg	  himself	  sprang	  to	  his	  feet,	  tapped	   his	   glass,	   and	   launched	   into	   a	   peroration:	   “Liebe	   Herren,	   Lieber	   Herr	  Warburg…	  To	  our	  great	  regret,	  we	  have	  learned	  that	  you	  have	  decided	  to	  leave	  the	   board	   of	   the	   company	   and	   consider	   this	   decision	   irrevocable.”3	  The	   story	  went	  round	  the	  world	  press,	  outside	  Germany.	  Max	  Warburg	  was	  a	  man	  of	  great	  aplomb	  and	  courage.	  	  
	  
Starting	  up	  in	  the	  City	  of	  London	  Siegmund	   Warburg	   left	   Germany	   in	   March	   1933	   for	   a	   visit	   to	   New	   York	   and	  decided	  from	  there	  to	  go	  to	  London	  and	  not	  return	  to	  Germany,	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  lethal	   nature	   of	   the	  Hitler	   regime.	  The	   environment	   of	   the	  City	   of	   London	  was	  stunted	   by	   contrast	   –	   to	   both	   Hamburg	   and	   New	   York.	   The	   New	   Trading	  Company	  was	  set	  up	  there	  in	  1934	  as	  an	  offshoot	  of	  the	  Warburgs’	  Amsterdam	  bank,	  and	  nursed	  into	  a	  free-­‐standing	  bank	  by	  Siegmund	  and	  his	  partner	  Henry	  Grunfeld	  becoming	  S.	  G.	  Warburg	  &	  Co.	  Ltd	  in	  January	  1946.	  City	  sentiment	  was	  hostile	   to	   German-­‐Jewish	   émigré	   bankers.	   Also,	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   did	   not	  approve	  of	  the	  methods	  by	  which	  German	  émigré	  fortunes	  were	  moved	  to	  safer	  waters	  through	  the	  Amsterdam	  office.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  was	   in	   a	   moral	   position	   to	   make	   such	   judgements	   when	   its	   own	   Governor,	  Montagu	   Norman,	   was	   a	   friend	   and	   supporter	   of	   the	   head	   of	   the	   Reichsbank,	  Hjalmar	   Schacht,	   and	   Norman	   backed	   Chamberlain	   on	   appeasement.	   Morality,	  however,	  has	  little	  leverage	  in	  matters	  of	  international	  capital	  transfers.	  What	  is	  more	   interesting	   is	   how	   S.G.	   Warburg	   &	   Co.	   expanded	   in	   a	   restrictive	  environment,	   and	   more	   generally	   how	   scruples	   embedded	   in	   local	   situations	  were	  overridden	  by	  Siegmund	  Warburg’s	  drive	   to	  create	  something	   from	  more	  or	  less	  nothing.	  	  It	   is	   surprising	   to	   note	   that	   Norman	   hung	   on	   as	   governor	   until	   1944.	   His	  insistence	  on	  the	  return	  to	  the	  Gold	  Standard	  in	  1925	  had	  alienated	  him	  from	  all	  the	  British	   political	   leaders.	  Unlike	   the	  United	   States’	   Federal	  Reserve,	   no	   new	  governor	  was	  appointed	  with	  new	  powers	  to	  resuscitate	  the	  economy.	  By	  1946,	  however,	  the	  Treasury	  was	  in	  firm	  control	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  (still	  formally	  a	  private	  company)	  and	  the	  Treasury’s	  overwhelming	  priority	  was	  to	  keep	  interest	  rates	  low	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  huge	  war	  loan	  issues.	  These	  were	  predominantly	  held	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overseas	  by	  sterling	  area	  countries,	  e.g.,	  Australia,	   India,	  Singapore.	  Britain	  had	  deficits	   in	   its	   trade	   balance	   and	   a	   wrecked	   industrial	   base.	   It	   was	   not	   able	   to	  break	  out	  of	   this	  uncomfortable	  situation	   for	  many	  years.	  Sterling	  could	  not	  be	  allowed	   to	   be	  made	   convertible	   –	   though	   in	   1947	   on	   the	   demand	   of	   the	   US	   it	  temporarily	  was,	  with	  disastrous	  consequences;	  capital	  controls	  were	  enforced,	  and	  British	  governments	  were	  periodically	  forced	  into	  devaluations	  of	  the	  pound	  that	  were	  politically	  embarrassing	  in	  the	  face	  of	  its	  wartime	  allies	  in	  the	  sterling	  area.	  So,	  the	  Treasury	  controlled	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  and	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  kept	   the	   banks	   –	   both	   countrywide	   and	   in	   the	   City	   –	   under	   a	   tight	   leash.	   That	  Westminster	  directed	  the	  Bank	  was	  resented	  by	  both	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  City.4	  	  Siegmund	   Warburg	   was	   confined	   to	   providing	   advice	   to	   British	   industrial	  companies	  and	  establishing	   credit	   arrangements	   for	   firms	   that	  were	   importing	  and	  exporting.	  By	  1943,	  in	  cooperation	  with	  N.M.	  Rothschild,	  it	  was	  able	  to	  lead	  on	   syndicates	   issuing	   shares	   and	  offering	   short	   and	   long	   term	   loans.	   The	   firm,	  then	  named	  New	  Trading	  Company,	  confined	  itself	   to	   fees	  and	  –	  minimizing	   its	  risks	  -­‐	  to	  small	  amounts	  of	  equity	  in	  share	  issues.	  As	  Grunfeld	  later	  explained,	  the	  New	  Trading	  Company	  had	   little	   room	  to	  operate	   in,	   and	   it	   could	  not	  afford	   to	  step	  on	  the	  toes	  of	  larger	  established	  City	  firms.	  	  	  	  So,	   how	   was	   it	   to	   expand?	   In	   1951,	   Bank	   of	   England	   officials	   regarded	   S.	   G.	  Warburg	  &	  Co.	  (as	   it	  had	  become)	  as	  a	   finance	  and	  investment	  house	  but	  not	  a	  merchant	   bank.	   That	   transition	   required	   membership	   of	   Accepting	   Houses	  Committee	   and	   this	   was	   achieved	   in	   1956	   by	   buying	   Seligman	   Brothers,	   an	  existing	  merchant	  bank	  with	  an	  account	  at	  the	  Bank	  of	  England.	  At	  a	  stroke	  this	  reduced	  the	  risk	  vulnerability	  of	  S.	  G.	  Warburg	  when	  it	  accepted	  bills	  of	  exchange	  from	   clients.	   Ever	   since	   the	   Overend	   Gurney	   triggered	   bank	   run	   of	   1866,	   the	  Bank	   of	   England	   had	   offered	   a	   permanently	   open	   liquidity	  window	   for	   bills	   of	  exchange,	  either	  discounting	  them	  or	  taking	  them	  on	  repo.	  Using	  the	  facility	  had	  become	  a	  closed	  shop	  for	  the	  merchant	  banks	  of	  the	  Accepting	  House	  Committee.	  	  	  Buying	  itself	  into	  the	  closed	  shop,	  then,	  was	  one	  strategy.	  Another	  strategy	  was	  to	  break	  the	  informal	  rules	  of	  business	  of	  City	  bankers.	  Siegmund	  Warburg,	  given	  his	   experience	   and	   survival,	   had	   few	   qualms	   about	   trampling	   on	   scruples.	  Warburg	   later	   recounted,	   in	   an	   interview	   with	   George	   Steiner,	   the	   prevailing	  attitudes.	   “Michael	   Berry,	   a	   partner	   at	   Robert	   Fleming	   and	   one	   of	   the	   then	  leading	  City	  bankers,	  said	  to	  me:	  ‘if	  it	  can	  happen	  that	  somebody	  can	  buy	  shares	  and	   obtain	   influence	   in	   a	   company	   and	   then	   change	   the	   management,	   which	  member	  of	  the	  management	  can	  sleep	  quietly	  in	  his	  bed?’	  I	  replied	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  was	  no	  reason	  for	  someone	  to	  sleep	  quietly	  in	  his	  bed	  if	  he	  was	  not	  doing	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  David	  Kynaston,	  City	  of	  London.	  The	  History,	  edited	  D.	  Miller.	  London:	  Chatto	  and	  Windus,	  2011.	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good	   job.”5	  Merchant	   banks	   did	   not	   launch	   hostile	   bids	   for	   companies,	   it	   was	  against	  the	  informal	  club	  code	  of	  the	  City.	  S.	  G.	  Warburg,	  however,	  led	  one	  of	  the	  first	   hostile	   bids	   for	   a	   company,	   British	   Aluminium.	   This	   divided	   the	   City’s	  merchant	  banks	   into	   two	  warring	  camps,	  as	  each	  outbid	   the	  other	   in	  gaining	  a	  controlling	   interest	  of	   the	  shares.	  S.G.	  Warburg	  &	  Co.	  played	   its	  hand	  carefully,	  secretly	   and,	   for	  many,	   duplicitously.	  Warburg	   was	   able	   to	  mobilize	   clients	   of	  Kuhn,	  Loeb	  in	  New	  York	  –	  which	  bank	  was	  part	  of	  the	  wider	  family	  Warburg	  –	  to	  enter	  the	  market	  and	  buy	  large	  quantities	  of	  British	  Aluminium	  shares,	  so	  that	  in	  January	   1959	   the	   take-­‐over	   was	   complete.	   Welcome	   to	   the	   age	   of	   investment	  banking	   red	   in	   tooth	   and	   claw	   and	   the	   prosperous	   business	   of	   mergers	   and	  acquisitions.	  	  
The	  failure	  of	  “rationalization”	  In	   reviewing	   the	   “Aluminium	   War”,	   Niall	   Ferguson	   reckoned	   that	   the	   firm	  Warburg’s	  were	  acting	  for	  (Reynolds-­‐TI	  and	  its	  backers)	  had	  paid	  too	  much	  and	  that	   Warburg	   had	   overestimated	   the	   growth	   potential	   of	   aluminium	   for	   the	  decade	  ahead.	  And	  on	  its	  acquisition	  of	  British	  Aluminium,	  Reynolds-­‐TI	  sold	  off	  the	  most	   profitable	   division,	   in	   Canada;	   i.e.	   investors’	   profits	   came	   from	   asset	  stripping.	  S.G.	  Warburg	  did	  well,	  despite	   the	  venomous	  rancour	   left	   in	   the	  City.	  They,	   as	   a	   firm	   had	   arrived,	   and	   it	   was	   the	  merchant	   bank	   to	   go	   to	   for	   those	  industrial	   firms	   with	   ambitious	   finance	   directors	   and	   chief	   executives	   that	  wanted	   to	   buy	   their	   way	   to	   greatness.	   S.G.	   Warburg’s	   profits	   almost	   doubled	  from	   1959	   to	   1960,	   and	   the	   1960s	   were	   the	   golden	   financial	   age	   with	   rising	  share	  prices	  and	  take-­‐over	  business.	  	  Warburg	   had	   no	   scruples	   leading	   the	   way	   in	   take-­‐overs.	   He	   regarded	   the	  management	  of	  most	  UK	   industrial	   firms,	  whose	  actual	   industrial	  processes	  he	  understood	   little	   –	   “never	   visit	   a	   factory”	   was	   his	   motto,	   as	   dunces	   who	   paid	  themselves	  too	  much	  money	  out	  of	  profits.	  This	  did	  not	  prevent	  Warburg	   from	  flattering	  the	  business	  leaders	  who	  came	  for	  advice	  outrageously	  –	  asking	  them	  to	  assume	  a	  world	  free	  of	  constraint	  and	  what	  they	  really	  wanted	  to	  do.	  Goethe’s	  Faust	   had	   its	   uses.	   Rationalization	  was	   the	   thing	   and	   Henry	   Grunfeld	  was	   the	  expert.	   Rationalization	   in	   industry	   did	   not	   derive	   from	   Max	   Weber’s	   famous	  concept	  which	  placed	   the	  emphasis	  on	   intellectual	   intensification	  of	   an	   idea	  or	  belief	   and	   its	   inner	   dynamic.	   Grunfeld	   had	   been	   heavily	   involved	   in	   the	  “modernization”	  of	   the	  German	  economy	   in	   the	  early	  years	  of	  Weimar	  and	  this	  process	   was	   dubbed	   rationalization:	   merging	   firms	   into	   larger	   units	   and	  improving	   inter-­‐firm	   coordination.	   S.G.	  Warburg	   acted	   as	   banker	   for	   the	  many	  mergers	   in	   the	  1960s	   in	   the	  British	   car	   industry	   –	  British	  Leyland	  and	  Rootes.	  Niall	  Ferguson	  judges	  that	  the	  hoped-­‐for	  economies	  of	  scale	  failed	  to	  materialize,	  as	   once	   famous	  marques	   in	   smaller	   factory	   units	   vanished	   into	   large	   anodyne	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  George	  Steiner	  Interview,	  Archives	  of	  LSE	  Library,	  Warburg/14/37,	  p.	  2.	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entities	   where	   mass	   unions	   and	   management	   slugged	   it	   out;	   while	   pride	   in	  design	   and	   workmanship	   became	   forgotten	   modes	   of	   conduct.	   A	   different	  economic	  policy	  would	  be	  for	  unprofitable	  firms	  to	  disappear,	  rather	  than	  being	  scooped	   up	   into	   some	   artificial	   entity,	   and	   the	   effective	   and	   profitable	   firms	  would	  still	  survive.	  	  Warburg	  pronounced:	  “We	  will	  move…	  to	  still	  bigger	  units	  in	  economic	  life	  of	  the	  Western	  world	  which,	  of	  course,	  from	  a	  human	  point	  of	  view	  is	  very	  regrettable	  but	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   technical	   developments	   of	   recent	   decades	   appears	  unavoidable.”	  6	  But	   as	  Ferguson	  poses	   the	  question:	   “was	   rationalization	  better	  for	   the	   bankers	   than	   the	   UK	   economy?”.7	  Warburg-­‐led	   rationalization	   blazed	   a	  scorched	   trail	   through	   Britain’s	   industrial	   sectors:	   cars,	   metals,	   shipbuilding,	  aircraft,	   textiles,	   newspapers,	   hotels,	   breweries	   and	   electrical	   engineering	  (though	   Warburg	   was	   outwitted	   by	   Arnold	   Weinstock	   on	   the	   take-­‐over	   of	  English	   Electric8).	   S.G.	  Warburg’s	   fees	   for	   an	   uncontested	   takeover	  was	   half	   of	  1%	   and	   for	   a	   hostile	   bid	   1%	   of	   the	   acquisition	   price.	   From	   1959	   to	   1969	   the	  firm’s	   profits	   in	   real	   terms	   rose	   sixfold.	   S.G.	  Warburg	   started	   a	   trend	   that	   has	  continued	  unabated	  to	  this	  day;	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  plausible	  to	  talk	  about	  an	   indigenous	   industrial	  base	   in	  the	  UK	  economy.	  Will	  Hutton	  brings	  the	  lamentable	   narrative	   up	   to	   date:	   “Over	   the	   last	   decade,	   a	   fifth	   of	   quoted	  companies	  have	  evaporated	  from	  the	  London	  Stock	  Exchange,	  the	  largest	  cull	  in	  our	   history.	   Since	   2004,	   £440bn	   worth	   of	   British	   companies	   have	   been	   sold	  overseas”.9	  Rationalization	   via	   mergers	   did	   not	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   the	   panacea	   of	  economic	   policy,	   as	   Prime	   Minister	   Harold	   Wilson	   believed,	   but	   it	   was	   the	  making	  of	  investment	  banking.	  	  	  
	  
Innovation	  through	  communication.	  The	  case	  of	  Eurobonds	  It	  would	   be	  wrong	   to	   assume	   that	  Warburg’s	   success	  was	   inevitable.	   As	   noted	  Warburg	  had	  to	  ride	  roughshod	  over	  existing	  City	  norms,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  one	  consensus	   in	   the	   UK	   Treasury	   or	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   that	   the	   national	   and	  international	  funding	  of	  merger	  activity	  was	  a	  desirable	  economic	  policy.	  Clearly,	  what	   above	   was	   referred	   to	   as	   Siegmund	   Warburg’s	   horizon	   of	   meaning,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Ferguson,	  High	  Financier,	  p.	  291	  7	  Ferguson,	  High	  Financier,	  p.	  304	  8	  Warburg	  opined	  of	  Weinstock:	  “Weinstock	  comes	  from	  small	  surroundings.	  His	  is	  outstandingly	  straight,	  not	  calculating,	  in	  fact	  remarkably	  so,	  but	  the	  passion	  of	  bigger	  aims	  beyond	  making	  money	  is	  not	  in	  him.”	  Warburg/14/37,	  p	  11.	  Weinstock's	  accounting	  mentality,	  reducing	  GEC	  to	  profit	  centres,	  meant	  that	  it	  	  became	  competitive	  in	  its	  parts	  but	  failed	  to	  develop	  a	  forward	  looking	  competitive	  industrial	  strategy.	  Though	  how	  GEC	  came	  to	  be	  vaporized,	  after	  Weinstock,	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  great	  mysteries	  and	  scandals	  of	  UK	  industrial	  history.	  9	  Will	  Hutton,	  ‘British	  capitalism	  is	  broken.	  Here’s	  how	  to	  fix	  it’,	  the	  guardian	  (11	  Feb	  2015).	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outstripped	   those	   of	   other	   agents	   in	   the	   economic	   sphere.	   To	   make	   things	  happen	  and	  for	  them	  to	  go	  Warburg’s	  way	  also	  involved	  a	  conscious	  strategy	  of	  information	  gathering	  and	  communication;	  communication	  within	  the	  firm	  itself	  –	   early	   morning	  meetings	   where	   activities	   had	   to	   be	   shared	   and	   all	   decisions	  agreed	   to	   by	  more	   than	   two	   partners;	   communication	   outside	   the	   firm	  where	  Siegmund	   Warburg	   was	   prodigious	   in	   courting	   industrial	   leaders,	   Bank	   of	  England	   officials,	   politicians	   –	   he	   wrote	   speeches	   for	   Harold	   Wilson,	   civil	  servants	   and,	   of	   course,	   his	   continuous	   correspondence	   with	   and	   visits	   to	   his	  extensive	   European,	   American	   and	   Japanese	   contacts.	   He	   insisted	   to	   partners	  and	  its	  public	  school	  recruited	  employees	  that	  the	  firms’	  reputation	  was	  built	  on	  “intensive	  …	  high	  quality	  personal	  services”.10	  In	  the	  Aluminium	  War	  it	  was	  the	  personal	  style	  of	  lobbying	  –	  of	  Bank	  of	  England	  officials,	  and	  members	  of	  Harold	  Macmillan’s	  Cabinet	   that	  was	  crucial	  as	  well	  as,	  obviously,	  major	   investors	  and	  protagonists	  –	  and	  briefing	  the	  press.	  The	   financial	  reporters	  came	  to	   the	  bank	  on	   a	   daily	   basis	   to	   speak	   with	   Warburg,	   and	   Warburg	   himself	   wrote	   the	  communiques	   for	   Reynolds–TI.	   Communicative	   investment	   was	   deployed	   in	  creating	   and	   making	   the	   market	   for	   take-­‐overs,	   and	   the	   best	   medium	   of	  communication	  was	  the	  face	  to	  face	  meeting,	  preferably	  over	  lunch.	  	  	  	  This	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  Siegmund	  Warburg’s	  greatest	  innovation,	  the	  Eurobond	  market	  –	  another	   first	   that	  structured	   the	   future	  growth	  of	   the	  City	  of	  London.	  International	   financial	   transactions	  were	   in	   lockdown	   during	   the	   late	   40s	   and	  early	   1950s.	   The	   commodity	   and	   future	   exchanges	   remained	   closed,	   capital	  controls	  were	  in	  place,	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  against	  its	  will,	  was	  told	  to	  enforce	  the	  capping	  of	  loans	  by	  the	  banks.	  Memories	  of	  the	  Depression	  in	  the	  1930s	  were	  strong	   and	   attitudes	   venomous	   towards	   the	   City	   of	   London	   and	   its	   less	   than	  glorious	   role.	   Above	   all,	   a	   citizen	   nation	   had	   been	   created	   in	   the	   postwar	  reconstruction,	  and	  national	  purpose	  was	  not	  to	  be	  undermined	  by	  the	  pursuit	  of	  particularistic	  financial	  interests.	  	  	  The	  two	  major	  reserve	  currencies	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  were	  the	  US	  dollar	  and	  the	  pound	  sterling.	  David	  Kynaston	  in	  his	  history	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London	  notes	  the	  City’s	   and	   Bank	   of	   England’s	   presumption	   that	   because	   sterling	  was	   a	   reserve	  currency	   it	  was	   the	  basis	   for	  a	  return	  to	   its	   international	  profile.	  But	  what	  was	  not	  grasped	  was	  the	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  the	   	  US	  dollar,	  which	  was	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  its	  “exorbitant	  privilege”,	  and	  the	  pound	  sterling	  whose	  holders	   faced	   the	   risk	   of	   the	   devaluation.	   Warburg’s	   opinion,	   quoted	   by	  Kynaston,	   was	   that	   Britain	   had	   become	   a	   debtor	   nation	   instead	   of	   a	   creditor	  nation,	  and	  a	  reserve	  currency	  status	  did	  not	  make	  sense	   for	  a	  debtor	  country.	  “It’s	  a	  very	  expensive	  luxury	  for	  us	  to	  have.”	  Warburg’s	  opinion	  was	  resented	  by	  the	   Governor	   of	   the	   Bank	   of	   England,	   the	   then	   assumption	   being,	   as	   Kynaston	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Ferguson,	  High	  Financier,	  p.	  249.	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writes,	  “sterling	  and	  the	  sterling	  area	  represented	  Britain’s	  financial	  ticket	  to	  the	  world’s	   top	   table”.11	  The	  Treasury	  and	  governments	  were	  against	   the	  return	  of	  London	   as	   an	   international	   capital	   market,	   for	   any	   movement	   of	   domestic	  savings	  into	  other	  currencies	  and	  countries	  would	  heavily	  reduce	  the	  value	  of	  the	  pound.	  The	  Bank	  of	  England	  had,	   reluctantly,	   to	   follow	  Treasury	  policy	   though	  one	   of	   its	   officials,	   George	   Bolton,	   was	   in	   discussion	   with	   merchant	   banks,	  including	  Warburg’s,	   on	   how	   to	   restore	   the	   old	   international	   City.	   As	   early	   as	  1952	  Bolton	  was	  advocating	  the	  full	  convertibility	  of	  sterling	  and	  the	  floating	  of	  the	  pound,	   the	   consequences	  of	  which	  would	  have	  been	   “disastrous,	  politically	  and	   commercially”	   in	   Alec	   Cairncross's	   view.12	  Bolton	   was	   intent	   on	   bringing	  back	   international	   finance	   in	   the	   same	   way	   that	   Kim	   Philby	   was	   working	   for	  international	  communism.	  	  Siegmund	  Warburg	   looked	  for	  new	  ways	   forward	  and	  he	  realized	  early	  on	  that	  European	  companies	  and	  banks	  in	  the	  course	  of	  international	  trade	  were	  holding	  US	  dollars	  as	  cash	  in	  their	  treasuries	  with	  no	  opportunity	  to	  obtain	  a	  return	  on	  them.	  (Short	  term	  deposits	  in	  New	  York	  were	  capped	  at	  a	  very	  low	  rate	  in	  order	  to	   discourage	   flows	   of	   hot	   money.)	   National	   governments	   quarantined	   these	  short-­‐term	  holdings	   from	  being	   converted,	   else	   their	  own	  currencies	  would	  be	  sold	  in	  exchange	  for	  dollars.	  Warburg’s	  idea	  was	  to	  observe	  the	  quarantine,	  but	  allow	   a	   market	   of	   corporate	   bonds,	   to	   be	   funded	   by	   dollars	   held	   in	   Europe	  (eurodollars).	   The	   first	   Eurobond	   issue,	   handled	   by	   S.G.	   Warburg,	   was	   a	   $15	  million	   loan	   to	   the	   Italian	   steel	   company,	   Finsider.	   As	   Ferguson	   explains:	   “To	  avoid	  UK	  stamp	  duty,	  the	  bonds	  were	  formally	  issued	  at	  Schiphol	  Airport	  in	  the	  Netherlands.	   To	   avoid	   UK	   income	   tax,	   the	   coupons	   were	   payable	   in	  Luxembourg.”13	  The	   coupon	   was	   free	   of	   withholding	   tax	   and	   was	   anonymous.	  This	  had	   the	  dual	   advantage	  of	   a	  dividend	   free	  of	   tax	  at	   source	  and	  a	   cashable	  and	  tradeable	  bond.	  	  “…the	  main	  ultimate	  buyers	  of	  the	  bonds	  were	  individuals,	  usually	  from	  Eastern	  Europe	  but	  often	  also	  from	  Latin	  America,	  who	  wanted	  to	  have	  part	  of	  their	  fortune	  in	  mobile	  form	  so	  that	  if	  they	  had	  to	  leave	  they	  could	  leave	  quickly	  with	  their	  bonds	  in	  a	  small	  suitcase.”	  The	  quote	  is	  from	  Ian	  Fraser	  an	  employee	  of	  Warburg’s	  at	  the	  time.14	  The	  bond	  was	  sold	  with	  a	  5.5%	  return.	  With	   stamp	   duty	   avoided	   –	   2%	   in	   the	   UK	   –	   and	   the	   income	   not	   having	   to	   be	  declared,	   this	  was	   an	   attractive	   proposition.	   By	   1968	   the	   volume	  of	   new	  bond	  issues	  was	  $5.5	  billion.	  Other	  banks	  quickly	   followed	  S.G.	  Warburg	  and	   foreign	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  David	  Kynaston,	  City	  of	  London.	  p.	  429.	  12	  Alec	  Cairncross,	  Years	  of	  Recovery.	  British	  Economic	  Policy	  1945-­51.	  London:	  Routledge,	  p.	  270.	  13	  Ferguson,	  High	  Financier,	  p.	  220.	  14	  Quoted	  by	  Ferguson,	  High	  Financier,	  p.	  220.	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banks	  flocked	  to	  London.	  The	  basis	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London	  as	  an	  off-­‐shore	  financial	  centre,	  and	  conduit	  for	  tax	  evasion	  and	  money	  laundering,	  had	  been	  secured.15	  	  Warburg’s	  motives	  were	  in	  part	  political.	  He	  really	  did	  want	  to	  establish	  a	  large	  and	  effective	  Europe-­‐wide	  capital	  market	   that	  would	   form	  one	  of	   the	  pillars	  of	  European	   integration.	   This	  was	   a	   delayed	   version	   of	   Stresemann	   and	   Briand's	  pre-­‐war	   efforts	   in	   that	   direction,	   of	   which	   Warburg	   was	   a	   full	   supporter.	  Integration	   of	   capital	   markets	   was	   only	   weakly	   supported	   by	   the	   European	  Commission	   and	   it	   was	   not	   encouraged	   by	   European	   national	   governments.	  Hence	   the	   Eurobond	   was	   an	   imaginative	   solution,	   but	   whether	   this	   was	   the	  optimum	   way	   of	   developing	   a	   European	   capital	   market	   will	   be	   a	   matter	   for	  economic	  historians	  to	  consider.	  As	  a	  financial	  innovation,	  it	  was	  brilliant	  –	  it	  put	  the	  hay	  where	  the	  donkey	  could	  eat	  it	  (as	  the	  Swedes	  say).	  But	  seen	  in	  terms	  of	  critical	  path	  dependency	  as	  well	  as	  the	  way	  financial	  minds	  were	  bent	  to	  think,	  the	  long	  term	  development	  was	  not	  completely	  felicitous,	  as	  we	  now	  know.	  	  Seen	  from	  Warburg’s	  perspective	  the	  critical	  path	  analysis	  should	  have	  led	  to	  a	  Europe	  wide	   capital	  market,	   and	   in	   a	   confused	  way	   it	   did	   eventually.	   But	   one	  cannot	  possibly	  think	  it	  proceeded	  in	  the	  manner	  –	  the	  road	  of	  haute	  finance	  and	  its	  relationship	  values	  –	  that	  Warburg	  hoped	  for.	  The	  two-­‐dimensional	  line	  on	  a	  piece	  of	  paper	  starting	  with	  Eurobonds,	  and	  that	  arrow	  meeting	  another	  labelled	  removal	  of	  national	  capital	  controls,	  eventuating	  in	  Europe	  wide	  capital	  markets,	  is	   not	   how	   it	   worked	   out.	   Here	   we	   can	   recall	   Edmund	   Husserl	   to	   our	   aid.	  Husserl’s	   notion	   of	   meaning	   was	   a	   good	   deal	   more	   prosaic	   than	   Siegmund	  Warburg’s	   proclivity	   to	   surplus	   meaning,	   whether	   in	   his	   disquisitions	   on	  Hamlet’s	   uncertainty	   or	   the	   depth	   psychology	   of	   Freud.	   We	   –	   anybody	   and	  everybody	  –	  make	  sense	  of	   the	  world	  by	  having	   reference	  points	   in	   the	  world.	  These	   are	   both	   explicit	   and	   implicit.	   We	   fill	   in	   our	   sense	   of	   reality	   within	   a	  horizon	  of	  meaning	  and	  this	  includes	  us	  in	  events	  and	  experiences	  that	  we	  never	  anticipated.	  The	  world	   in	   its	  brute	   empirical	   complexity	   is	  not	   intelligible	   –	  by	  anyone,	  even	  economists.16	  	  	  Warburg	  innovated	  a	  marker,	  the	  Eurobond,	  that	  became	  a	  beacon	  and	  not	  just	  a	  reference	   point	   for	   profit-­‐driven	   banks.	   Warburg	   was	   quite	   clear	   that	   the	  profitability	  of	  his	  innovation	  would	  soon	  be	  reduced	  by	  imitators.	  The	  imitator	  banks	   changed	   the	   institutional	   habitus	   of	   the	   City	   of	   London.	   The	   sheer	  quantitative	   expansion	   of	   the	   Eurobond	   market	   placed	   deals	   beyond	   a	  relationship	  forged	  between	  merchant	  banker,	  the	  firm	  that	  required	  funds,	  and	  consideration	  for	  the	  customers	  who	  would	  buy	  the	  bonds.	  Warburg	  had	  not	  just	  created	  a	  financial	  instrument,	  he	  had	  inaugurated	  a	  new	  market	  –	  and	  not	  of	  his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  See	  Nick	  Kochan,	  ‘Hedge	  Funds	  and	  Tax	  Havens’,	  in	  S.	  Whimster	  (ed.),	  Reforming	  the	  
City.	  Responses	  to	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis.	  London:	  Forum	  Press,	  pp.	  133-­‐149.	  16	  David	  Woodruff	  Smith,	  Husserl.	  London:	  Routledge,	  2007,	  pp.	  286-­‐294.	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own	  making	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  his	  own	  predile§ctions.	  Out	  of	   the	  many	  Eurobond	  issues	   developed	   a	   secondary	   market,	   and	   out	   of	   the	   dealing	   in	   secondary	  markets	   developed	   the	   portfolio	   analysis	   of	   the	   konvolut:	   risk	   and	   return,	  interest	   rates,	  and	  when	   to	  crystallize	  paper/trades.	  And	  out	  of	   that	  developed	  the	   derivative	  markets	   of	   call	   and	   put	   options,	   and	   out	   of	   them	   the	   insurance	  market	   of	   collateral	   debt	   obligations.	   Bulk	   meant	   that	   deposit	   taking	   banks	  (Universalbanken)	  were	  the	  new	  thugs	  on	  the	  block	  with	  their	  armies	  of	  traders	  and	  bond	  salespersons.	  The	  sharp	  lines	  of	  critical	  path	  analysis	  give	  way	  to	  the	  ever-­‐expanding	  cross-­‐hatching	  of	  dense	  confusion.	  	  	  Warburg	  had	  a	  sharp	  sense	  of	  himself	  as	  the	  man	  of	  the	  moment.	  When	  he	  semi-­‐retired	  to	  Switzerland	  in	  the	  1970s	  (taking	  two	  secretaries	  with	  him	  to	  monitor	  the	   office	   and	   maintain	   the	   correspondence),	   Warburg	   got	   his	   friend	   George	  Steiner	  to	  interview	  him	  on	  his	  life	  and	  his	  views	  on	  the	  same.	  On	  the	  terrace	  of	  Blonay	   overlooking	   Lake	  Geneva,	   Steiner	   explored	   the	   serendipity	   of	   the	   great	  innovator:	  “Would	  it	  be	  fair	  to	  ask	  whether	  the	  British	  Aluminium	  war	  changed	  the	   fortunes	  of	  your	  personal	   life,	  of	  your	   firm	  and	  the	  City?”	  S.G.W.	  replies:	   “It	  certainly	  did.	  To	   take	   the	  City:	  To	   change	   the	  aspect	  of	   the	  City	  was	  not	   in	  my	  mind	  at	   the	   time.	   It	  was	  a	  semi-­‐automatic	  result	  of	  what	  occurred.	  What	  really	  happened	  was	  that	  a	  very	  good	  friend	  of	  mine	  in	  New	  York,	  Hans	  Vogelstein	  [an	  executive	  of	  American	  Metal],	  …	  often	  talked	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  so	  many	  of	  the	  top	  British	  industrial	  companies	  were	  badly	  managed	  and	  that	  their	  shares	  were	  basically	  highly	  undervalued	  since	  earnings	  could	  be	  greatly	   improved	  if	   it	  was	  possible	  to	  re-­‐organize	  the	  management.”.17	  Lord	  Portal,	  the	  chairman	  of	  British	  Aluminium	  at	  this	  point,	  was	  a	  war	  hero	  and	  ex-­‐admiral,	  and	  commerce	  did	  not	  appreciate	   the	   unreflective	   bravery	   of	   the	   Navy.	   Portal	   did	   not	   countenance	  hostile	   bids,	   and	   he	   probably	   did	   not	   sufficiently	   realize	   that	   if	   predators	   buy	  your	   shares	   in	   sufficient	   quantities	   you	   lose	   your	   command.	   One	   world	   of	  meaning	  erases	  another.	  	  Looking	  to	  the	  future,	  Steiner	  asks:	  “What	  in	  your	  view	  is	  the	  general	  economic	  and	  special	  function	  of	  a	  merchant	  bank	  within	  the	  general	  economy?”	  S.G.W:	  “In	  my	  view	  within	  the	  next	  twenty	  years,	  there	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  merchant	  banks	  as	  we	  understand	  them	  today	  but	  rather	   joint	  banking/accountancy	   firms.	   I	  could	  visualize,	   for	   instance,	   mergers	   between	   merchant	   banks	   and	   the	   big	  accountancy	   firms	   such	   as	   Price	   Waterhouse,	   Peat	   Marwick.”	   This	   is	   almost	  prescient,	  since	  the	  cartel	  of	  accountancy	  firms	  were	  instead	  merely	  co-­‐opted	  to	  approve	   the	   solvency	   of	   banks,	   which	   in	   2007	   and	   2008	   were	   insolvent	  (something,	   in	   the	   UK,	   that	   is	   against	   the	   law).	  Warburg	   continues:	   “Merchant	  banking	   is	   already	   changing	   radically,	   and	   in	   this	   respect	  my	   firm	   has	  made	   a	  contribution.	  This	  has	  been	  acknowledged	   to	  me	  by	  both	  Cobbold	  and	  O’Brien.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Warburg/14/37,	  p.	  1.	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Maybe	  one	  day	  we	  will	  go	  out	  of	  the	  money	  lending	  business	  altogether,	  leaving	  this	  side	  of	  the	  business	  to	  the	  joint	  stock	  banks.	  At	  present	  the	  mixture	  of	  money	  lending	  or	  borrowing	  with	  advisory	  functions	  fits	  well	  together	  and	  the	  two	  sides	  enrich	  one	  another	  but	  this	  may	  not	  remain	  so.”18	  	  	  
	  
The	  uncertainty	  of	  second	  order	  reference	  Siegmund	  Warburg	  was	  slightly	  too	  paradoxical	  for	  the	  good	  of	  his	  own	  firm.	  He	  regarded	   handling	   other	   people’s	   money	   as	   the	   work	   of	   the	   cheapskate	  
Börsianer.	  Unnoticed	  by	  him	  the	  rise	  of	  money	  manager	  capitalism	  had	  become	  a	  dominant	   and	   profitable	   activity	   in	   leading	   financial	   centres.	   Citizens’	   pension	  funds,	  sovereign	  wealth	  funds,	  and	  illicitly	  gained	  money	  all	  had	  to	  be	  managed.	  Mercury	  Asset	  Management	  became	  the	  profitable	  division	  of	  S.G.	  Warburg,	  and	  when	  it	  was	  eventually	  sold	  off,	  it	  was	  seriously	  underpriced,	  perhaps	  reflecting	  the	  disdain	  of	  the	  high	  financier.	  Weimar	  values	  no	  longer	  counted,	  the	  horizon	  of	  meaning	  had	  moved	  elsewhere,	  projected	  by	  entirely	  new	  financial	  agents.	  	  	  The	   Ferguson	   biography	   was	   launched	   at	   Gresham	   College	   in	   June	   2010.	   A	  retired	  banker	  (ex-­‐Warburg	  and	  Lazards),	   the	  Gresham	  Professor	  of	  Commerce	  Kenneth	  Costa,	  made	  a	  plea	  for	  the	  return	  of	  relationship	  banking	  as	  typified	  by	  Siegmund	  Warburg.	  He	   also	   called	   for	   a	   new	   attitude	   in	   banking	   based	   on	   the	  values	  of	  respect,	  honesty	  and	  service.	  	  	  Five	  years	  on	  Lebensreform	  has	  not	  happened	  and	  it	  will	  not	  happen.	  Siegmund	  Warburg’s	  moral	   stance	   as	   a	   banker,	   as	   comes	   out	   from	   the	   Steiner	   interview,	  was	   pharisaical,	   which	   is	   an	   understandable	   stance	   for	   a	   banker.	   The	   avowed	  Christian,	  Stephen	  Green,	  ex-­‐chairman	  of	  HSBC,	  is	  at	  present	  regarded	  in	  public	  opinion	  as	   a	   rank	  hypocrite.	  Major	  banks	  have	  been	   revealed	   as	  being	  directly	  involved	  in	  tax	  evasion,	  money	  laundering,	  engineering	  odious	  loans,	  mis-­‐selling	  products,	   and	   countless	   examples	   of	   the	   manipulation	   of	   markets	   and	  transactions	  rigged	  in	  the	  banks’	  favour.	  And	  even	  with	  a	  roulette	  wheel	  with	  ten	  zeros	  they	  still	  managed	  to	  become	  bankrupt,	  saved	  at	  the	  last	  hour	  by	  massive	  Treasury	  cash	   injections.	  These	  behaviours	  are	  so	  extensive	  and	  prevalent,	  and	  intrinsic	  to	  London’s	  competitive	  regulatory	  arbitrage,	  that	   it	   is	  hard	  to	  discern	  what	  would	  now	  count	  as	  fair	  dealing.	  	  	  Costa	   argues	   that	   the	   cause	   of	   the	   financial	  meltdown	  was	   neither	   integration	  nor	  size	  of	  the	  institutions.	  “The	  crisis	  from	  which	  we	  are	  slowly	  emerging	  was	  the	   outcome	   of	   duties	   owed	   but	   not	   met,	   responsibilities	   incurred	   but	   not	  fulfilled.	   At	   bottom,	   it	   is	   about	   good	   moral	   practice	   as	   well	   as	   good	   business	  practice.	  It	   is	  about	  finance's	  relation	  with	  society	  at	  large,	  the	  silent	  partner	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	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any	  transaction	  who	  in	  the	  end	  legitimises	  what	  we	  do	  and	  makes	  it	  possible.	  It	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  moral	  basis	  of	  capitalism…	  This	  means	  that	  relationship	  banking	  is	  not	  a	  subset	  of	  behaviour,	  suitable	  for	  parts	  of	  an	  institution	  when	  convenient.	  It	  has	  to	  be	  embedded	  in	  the	  DNA	  of	  the	  whole	  institution.”19	  	  Viewing	   financial	   agents	   in	   complex	   networks	   as	   responding	   via	   embedded	  informational	   structures	   is	   an	   interesting	   analogy	   –	   though	   quite	   beyond	   the	  genetic	   engineering	   Costa	   envisages.	   The	   question	   to	   ask	   is	   what	   comes	   after	  relationship	  banking,	  what	  is	  the	  horizon	  of	  meaning	  that	  encompasses	  the	  new	  world	   of	   “transactional	   banking”?	   One	   answer	   is	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   point	   of	  reference	  is	  no	  longer	  direct	  and	  knowable,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  when	  bankers	  dealt	  directly	  with	  their	  clients.	  	  	  One	  seeks	  to	  understand,	  as	  a	  sociologist,	  why	  it	  is	  that	  a	  transaction	  between	  a	  banker	   and	   client	   can	   no	   longer	   be	   thought	   of	   in	   terms	   of	   trust,	   morality,	  competence	  or	  some	  knowledgeability	  of	  the	  other	  party’s	  behaviour.	  It	  is	  quite	  hard	   to	   explain	   the	   executives	   of	   Lehman	   Brothers20	  making	   huge	   but	   idiotic	  deals	   when	   they	   knew	   the	   firm	   was	   about	   to	   explode.	   Likewise,	   regulatory	  agencies	  operate	  to	  expedite	  the	  financial	  system.	  Financial	  agents	  are	  no	  longer	  predictable,	   their	   rationality	   no	   longer	   decipherable.	   The	   reference	   points	  through	  which	  the	  world	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  meaningful	  no	  longer	  hold.	  Relationship	  banking	   assumes	   a	   world	   where	   meaning	   is	   no	   longer	   configured	   as	   once	  thought.	   Stephen	   Green	   may	   well	   have	   assumed	   his	   values	   were	   shared	  throughout	  his	  banking	  empire	  and	  from	  this	  stance	  his	  sin	  is	  a	  misplaced	  sense	  of	   organizational	   coherence	  and	   consensus.	  Relationship	  banking	  assumes	   that	  individual	   agents	   are	   underpinned	   by	   order	   and	   value	   and	   an	   accompanying	  institutional	  solidity,	  but	  this	  no	  longer	  is	  the	  case.21	  This	  was	  starkly	  revealed	  in	  the	   UK	   House	   of	   Commons	   Select	   Committee	   that	   called	   before	   it	   another	  executive	  of	  HSBC,	  Rhona	  Fairhead,	  whose	   "area"	  of	   responsibility	  was	  private	  banking.	   The	   issue	   for	   the	   Select	   Committee,	   and	   an	   increasingly	   indignant	  British	  public,	  was	  why	  HSBC's	  private	  bank	  in	  Switzerland	  handled	  the	  accounts	  of	  so	  many	  tax	  evaders	  -­‐	  even	  a	  possible	  14,000	  accounts.	  The	  Select	  Committee	  found	   her	   excuse	   risible	   that	   she	   had	   no	   knowledge	   of	   the	   bank's	   tax	   evasion	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Kenneth	  Costa,	  ‘High	  Financier:	  Sir	  Siegmund	  Warburg	  and	  the	  Art	  of	  Relationship	  Banking’.	  	  <http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-­‐and-­‐events/high-­‐financier-­‐sir-­‐siegmund-­‐warburg-­‐and-­‐the-­‐art-­‐of-­‐relationship-­‐banking>	  20	  	  21	  Niall	  Ferguson	  offers	  a	  history	  of	  Warburg	  as	  a	  City	  house.	  Another	  explanation	  for	  Siegmund	  Warburg’s	  excessive	  emphasis	  on	  order	  as	  control	  was	  his	  larger	  ambition	  to	  build	  an	  international	  banking	  house	  in	  the	  manner	  of	  the	  Rothschild	  empire.	  Siegmund	  Warburg’s	  frequent	  visits	  to	  Kuhn,	  Loeb	  in	  New	  York	  and	  Brinckmann	  (as	  M.M.	  Warburg	  was	  aryanised	  to)	  as	  well	  as	  link	  ups	  with	  Banque	  de	  Paris	  et	  des	  Pays-­‐Bas	  come	  across	  as	  something	  of	  a	  distraction	  from	  the	  City	  operation.	  But	  it	  was	  true	  Weimar	  cosmopolitanism	  that	  Warburg	  strove	  for,	  not	  the	  limited	  charms	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London.	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schemes:	   "frontline	   staff",	   she	   said,	   had	   ignored	   "structures"	   and	   there	  was	   an	  absence	   of	   a	   "controlled	   environment".	   This	   merits	   sociological	   investigation,	  though	  clearly	  the	  British	  public	  are	  demanding	  simple	  direct	  responsibility.	  	  Siegmund	   Warburg	   placed	   a	   particular	   stress	   on	   order.	   It	   comes	   out	   in	   his	  interview	  with	  George	   Steiner,	  who	   had	   asked	   in	  what	  way	  merchant	   banking	  was	   increasing	   “the	   amount	   of	   freedom,	   i.e.	   is	   the	  mixture	  moving	   forward	   to	  socialism?”	   After	   some	   nostrums	   on	   the	   mixed	   economy,	   Warburg	   continued:	  “The	  world	   is	   unjust.	   I	   believe	  with	  Henry	  Kissinger	   that	  whilst	   justice	   is	   very	  important,	   order	   or	   balance	   is	   at	   least	   as	   important	   as	   justice.	   The	   two	  do	  not	  always	  go	  together	  although	  we	  try	  to	  combine	  them.	  A	  merchant	  bank	  can	  help	  in	  bringing	  about	  more	  order,	  balance	  and	  stability.”22	  Niall	  Ferguson	  brings	  out	  very	  well	  the	  organizational	  structure	  and	  control	  of	  S.G.	  Warburg	  &	  Co.	  Warburg	  was	  an	  obsessive	  not	  just	  on	  the	  forms	  of	  politesse	  but	  of	  knowing	  exactly	  where	  things	   stood	   at	   any	  moment.	  He	  preferred	   fees	   and	   commissions	   than	   risk	   the	  firm’s	  capital	  in	  taking	  propriety	  positions.	  Markets	  as	  he	  knew	  can	  turn	  against	  you	  and	  devastate	  the	  over-­‐exposed	  –	  a	  lesson	  completely	  forgotten	  in	  the	  post-­‐Warburg	  financial	  world.	  	  The	   premier	   sociologist	   of	   the	   late	   20th	   century,	   Niklas	   Luhmann,	   argues	   that	  order	   comes	   before	   society. 23 	  The	   social	   world	   exists	   in	   various	   states	   of	  complexity	   and	   the	   sociological	   achievement	   of	   reducing	   entropy	   has	   as	   its	  outcome	  a	  sense	  of	   society.	  Warburg’s	  whole	  career	  was	  dedicated	   to	   resisting	  entropy	   and	   disorder.	   To	   create	   order	   in	   the	  world	   of	   finance,	   he	   built	   a	   tight	  organizational	  structure	  with	  clear	  rules	  of	  behaviour	  and	  conduct.	  	  	  Luhmann’s	  major	  thesis	  was	  that	  achieving	  order	  and	  thereby	  creating	  society	  is	  increasingly	  difficult	  under	  modern	  conditions.	   In	  a	  traditional	  world	  of	  estates	  and	   castes,	   everyone	   knows	   their	   place	   and	   order	   is	   secured.	   In	   the	  transformational	  period	  of	  the	  18th	  century	  Enlightenment,	  order	  was	  secured	  by	  assuming	  that	  the	  social	  world	  is	  peopled	  by	  autonomous	  and	  rational	  subjects.	  Society,	  then,	  was	  the	  Enlightenment.	  In	  20th	  to	  21st	  century	  modernity,	  so	  much	  change	   is	  occurring	  at	   the	  structural	   level	   that	   individuals,	  or	  agents,	  no	   longer	  can	  trust	  the	  points	  of	  reference	  and	  meaning	  which	  they	  grew	  up	  with	  or	  were	  educated	  into.	  “Life-­‐long	  education”	  is	  a	  despairing	  admission	  that	  contemporary	  modernity	  is	  always	  changing	  and	  that	  grounding	  lives	  in	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  patterns	  is	   no	   longer	   possible.	   While	   Costa,	   and	   Ferguson,	   praise	   the	   values	   of	   S.G.	  Warburg,	  by	   the	  1980s	   the	   firm	  was	  becoming	  an	  anachronism,	  overshadowed	  by	   universal	   banks,	   money	   managers,	   and	   derivatives	   trading.	   It	   disappeared	  into	   the	   maw	   of	   UBS	   via	   the	   Swiss	   Bank	   Corporation,	   its	   name	   eventually	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Warburg/14/37,	  p.	  9.	  23	  Niklas	  Luhmann,	  Social	  Systems,	  trans.	  J.	  Bednarz	  Jr.	  with	  D.	  Baecker.	  Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1995.	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disappearing.	   S.G.Warburg’s	   was	   run	   by	   the	   “uncles”	   a	   generation	   of	   émigré	  German	   businessmen	   who	   recruited	   public	   school	   men	   after	   a	   very	   selective	  interview	  process.	  This	  quaint	  form	  of	  authoritarianism	  could	  not	  survive,	  just	  as	  the	  social	  norms	  of	  the	  gentleman’s	  club	  in	  the	  City	  did	  not	  survive	  beyond	  the	  1950s.	  	  	  Niklas	   Luhmann	   died	   in	   1998,	   before	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis.	   He	   perhaps	  would	  have	  been	  one	  of	  the	  few	  people	  to	  welcome	  the	  crisis,	  since	  it	  confirmed	  his	   thesis	  of	   the	   tendency	   to	   increasing	  complexity	  and	  entropy	  under	  modern	  conditions.	  Using	  Husserl’s	   idea	   that	  our	  consciousness	   is	   tethered	   to	  points	  of	  reference,	   the	   sociological	   version	   of	   this	   is	   that	   reference	   points	   in	   the	   social	  world	   are	   unhinged.	   We	   cannot	   rely	   upon	   them.	   For	   example,	   trading	   in	  derivatives	  operated	   through	   the	   illusion	   conferred	  by	   the	   rating	  agencies	   that	  the	  financial	  product	  had	  the	  value	  as	  was	  stated	  on	  the	   label.	  But	   in	  the	  crisis,	  each	   banker	   could	   not	   trust	   the	   word	   of	   another	   banker.	   The	   realization	   had	  dawned	  that	  they	  did	  not	  know	  the	  true	  value	  of	  their	  own	  financial	  assets	  and	  
pari	  passu	  neither	  did	  their	  competitors.	  Radical	  uncertainty	  prevailed.	  	  	  Bankers	   may	   be	   able	   to	   draw	   some	   measure	   of	   exoneration	   from	   Niklas	  Luhmann	  because,	   in	   a	   narrow	   interpretation,	   this	   lack	   of	   reliable	   reference	   is	  the	  modern	   condition:	   one	  has	   to	   rely	  on	   the	  unreliable,	  what	  Luhmann	   terms	  second	  order	  reference.	  The	  larger	  interpretation	  infers	  that	  finance	  is	  unable	  to	  reform	  itself.	  The	  virus	  of	  uncertainty	  spread	  most	  quickly	  in	  the	  informationally	  fecund	  environment	  of	  the	  financial	  world.	  There	  is	  no	  solution	  to	  modernity	  just	  as	  there	  is	  no	  cure	  for	  the	  dysfunctional	  entropy	  of	  finance.	  	  	  	  NOTES	  	  
